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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this Court pursuant to § 78-22(3)(j) of the Utah Code Annotated, as amended.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did

the

district

court

rule

correctly

in denying

plaintiff's motion for a new trial?
2.

Did the district court rule correctly in allowing the

admission of jury instruction number 10?
3.

Did the district court rule correctly in excluding the

investigating officer's testimony as to the cause of the subject
accident?
4. Did the district court rule correctly in allowing the use
of Donald Kennedy's prior inconsistent statement for impeachment?
5.

Is this a frivolous appeal entitling defendant to double

costs and reasonable attorney's fees?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
As a general proposition "It is the exclusive province of the
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses, weigh the
evidence, and make findings of fact.

(Cites omitted).

Where the

evidence is conflicting and the jury is properly instructed, we do
not upset those findings of fact on appeal except upon a showing
that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict,

so

clearly

preponderated

in appellant's

favor that

reasonable persons could not differ on the outcome of the case.
Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. . 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983).
1

See also

Hodges v. Gibson Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991).
1.

As to issue number 1:

" . . . [A]n insufficiency -of-the

evidence based challenge to a denial of [a motion for a new trial]
is governed by one standard of review:

"We reverse only if,

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who
prevailed, we conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support
the verdict."
2.

Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 1988).

As to issue number 2:

. . .

"[A]n improper jury

instruction is grounds for "reversible error

'if it tends to

mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party7".
Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230 (Ut. App. 1991) see also
Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 435 (Ut. App. 1987).
3. As to issue number 3;

"The trial court has discretion to

determine the admissibility of expert testimony, and to determine
if the witness is qualified to give an opinion on a particular
matter.

(Cites omitted.)

Such a ruling will not be reversed

unless the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert
testimony, and, even then, only if the appellant can show the
' excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence
in bringing about a different verdict.7"

. . . Anton v. Thomas,

806 P.2d 744, 746 (Ut. App. 1991).
4.

As to issue number 4:

..."

In reviewing questions of

admissibility of evidence at trial, deference is given to the trial
court's advantageous position; thus, that court's rulings regarding
admissibility will not be overturned "unless it clearly appears
2

that the lower court was in error."

Whitehead v. American Motors

Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990).
5. As to issue number 5;

"If a court shall determine that a

motion made or appeal taken under these rules is either frivolous
or for delay, it shall award just damages and single or double
costs, including reasonable attorneys fees, to the prevailing
party."

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990).
STATUTES AND RULES

Defendant cited the following (attached as Exhibit 2) : (1)
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-49; (2) Utah Code Ann.

§41-6-55; (3)

Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33; (4) Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Rule 34; (5)
40;

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule

(6) Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702; (7) Utah Rules of

Evidence, Rule 704; 8.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a jury verdict entered in favor of
defendant Warren Yarnell in the Second Judicial District Court in
and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable Ronald O. Hyde
presiding.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

An automobile accident occurred

involving plaintiff Tina Noonan
Yarnell (Yarnell).

6, 1987,

(Noonan) and defendant Warren

Said accident occurred at approximately 923

South and 1900 West, Ogden, Utah.
2.

on April

(R.l)

Mr. Yarnell was traveling north on 1900 West, a two lane
3

road, one lane heading northbound and one lane heading southbound.
At the intersection of 1900 West and 12th South there is a stop
light and a left turn lane.

(T.54 lines 11-13, 25; T.63 lines 12-

16; T.129 lines 6-10; T.130 lines 9-12.)
3. Ms. Noonan was proceeding north on 1900 West ahead of Mr.
Yarnell. When Ms. Noonan reached the intersection of 1900 West and
12th South she realized she had missed her turn.
to make a U-turn.

Her thought was

She looked in her rearview mirror and realized

traffic was coming behind her and decided to go through the
intersection, "find a piece of shoulder up further where I could
turn off of the road and make a U-turn to the left."

(T.42 lines

14-25, T.54 lines 3-7.)
4. It was her testimony she decided to go down the road where
she saw a farmhouse on the westside of the road and then make her
U-turn.
5.

(T.43 lines 5-10; T.44 lines 8-19; T.55 lines 10-13.)
Ms. Noonan proceeded through the intersection, saw Mr.

Yarnell behind her and decided to turn onto the shoulder to make a
U-turn.

(T.59 lines 1-11; T.57 lines 1-15; T.58 lines 15-20.)

6. Ms. Noonan testified that she did not put her turn signal
on until she went through the intersection because her "intent was
to let [Yarnell] know well in advance that I intended to make a
left turn and move out of that lane of traffic."
testified she gave Mr. Yarnell sufficient notice.

In fact she

(T.44 lines 22-

25; T.45 lines 1-2; T.46 lines 19-25; T.47 line 1.)
7.

Her

statement

taken

at
4

the

time

of

the

accident

contradicts her trial testimony.

Her statement

specifically

stated:
"I was northbound on 1900 West and preparing
to make a left turn to turn around as I had
missed my turn. When I saw the vehicle behind
me was coming up on my back quickly I turned
my left turn signal on to make sure he knew I
was turning.
. . . "
(Plaintiff's Trial
Exhibit I).
8. Just prior to making her U-turn she looked into the rearview mirror again and decided she could not make the U-turn from
the left side of the street because Mr. Yarnell was approaching her
too fast.

(T.60 lines 11-25;

T.61 line 1.)

9. Ms. Noonan then made another split second decision to pull
onto the shoulder.

In fact she testified she really didn't know

what she was going to do.

(T.60 lines 24-25; T.61 lines 1-7; T.67

lines 5-11.)
10.

Ms. Noonan testified that when she turned on her left

turn signal it was her intent to turn into a driveway in front of
a farmhouse.
11.
driveway

(T.62 lines 1-4.)

The point of impact was some 76 feet from the farmhouse
as

determined

by

Ms.

Noonan's

own

expert,

the

investigating officer and Mr. Yarnell's expert. Ms. Noonan was nowhere near the driveway. (T.159 lines 19-22; T.160 lines 18-25;
T.161 lines 1-2, and 16-20; T.218 lines 1-17; T.386 lines 22-24.)
12.

When Ms. Noonan saw Mr. Yarnell coming behind her she

could have gone to the next intersection and turned around.

She

elected not to because "I wanted to get out of the way and get back
5

to where I needed to be."
13.

(T.63 lines 8-11.)

Ms. Noonan was not familiar with the area.

In fact she

changed her mind two or three times with respect to where she was
going to make this U-turn.
turn.

It was never her intent to make a left

(T.63 lines 17-23.)
14.

Further, Ms. Noonan didn't slow down until she actually

started to make her turn. By her own testimony the Yarnell vehicle
was coming fast behind her and was close enough for her to see Mr.
and Mrs. Yarnell allegedly having a discussion and she turned in
front of them anyway.

(T.45 lines 16-25; T.46 lines 1-5; T.61

lines 8-11; T.65 lines 1-2; T.66 lines 4-7; T.67 lines 2-4.)
Q:

What happened next?

A:
I did one more rear-view check in my
mirror and I noticed that the people in the
car were having some kind of discussion. I
went ahead and made my left turn, . . .
(T.45 lines 21-25; T46:
15.

lines 1-5.)

Mr. and Mrs. Yarnell were stopped at the light at the

intersection 1900 West and 12th South.

(T.129 lines 6-10.)

16. Mr. Yarnell was through the intersection when he saw Mrs.
Noonan's brake lights come on and her vehicle move to the right.
(T.118 lines 24-25; T.129 lines 22-21; T.131 lines 4-18; T.137
lines 3-14.)
17.

When Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan pull to the right he

"pulled over a little ways" but did not make a lane change.
lines 14-17.)
6

(T.125

18. Mrs. Yarnell also saw Ms. Noonan move to the right.

She

saw one blink of a turn signal just prior to Ms. Noonan turning in
front of them.

(T.365 lines 1-14; T.373 lines 21-25; T.374 lines

1-5; T.375 lines 10-20.)
19. Mrs. Yarnell testified that they were traveling 30 to 35
miles per hour.
M

lights.

They had no time to stop when they saw the brake

I mean I didn't have enough time to grit my teeth."

(T.374 lines 20-25.)
20. Mr. Yarnell also testified there was no way to avoid the
collision.
21.

(T.123 lines 11-13; T.124 lines 11-15.)
When Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan's brake lights and saw

her move to the right he thought she was going to stop.

He

attempted to pull around her, when she turned right in front of
him.

(T.129 lines 12-21; T.130 lines 15-19; T.131 lines 13-21;

T.137 lines 3-13.)
22.

Mr. Yarnell never saw Ms. Noonan's left turn signal

despite what it said in his statement.

Further, Mr. Yarnell never

wrote that statement even though he signed it. His wife was there
at the time the statement was taken and had input into the
statement.

(T.114 lines 24-25; T.115 lines 1-22; T.116 lines 1-25;

T.117 lines 3-9; T.119 line 5; T.368 lines 7-25; T.369 line 1.)
23.

The investigating officer Bruce Hartman arrived at the

scene and observed a large semi-tractor parked off the side of the
road.

(T.141 lines 5-8.)
24.

He subsequently took statements from Mr. Yarnell and Ms.
7

Noonan.

He did not take a statement from Mrs. Yarnell because he

felt that she was too upset.

This is contradicted

Yarnell's testimony wherein she stated that she was fine.
line 25; T.145 lines 1-2;
25.

At

the

scene

by Mrs.
(T.144

T.369 lines 18-23.)
of the

accident

Sgt. Bruce Hartman

determined that the point of impact was 76 feet north of the
driveway Ms. Noonan allegedly was going to turn into.

He also

testified that Ms. Noonan was not near the driveway when she was
signaling.

(T.159 lines 19-23; T.160 lines 18-25; T.161 lines 1-2

and 16-20.)
26.

While at the scene Officer Hartman testified that he

checked the rightside of the road for debris and furrow marks in
the gravel in both directions for 300 feet.
markings on the right side of the road.
27.

He did not find any

(T.158 lines 9-13.)

At the hospital he had Mr. Yarnell prepare a written

statement. He testified he saw Mr. Yarnell write the statement and
that he reviewed it with him.

(T.162 lines 23-25; T.163 lines 1-

6.)
28. Mr. Yarnell testified that the signature on the statement
was his signature.

However, his daughter-in-law had written the

statement with input from both he and his wife.

(T.114 lines 24-

25; T.115 lines 1-22; T.116 lines 1-25; T.117 lines 3-9; T.119 line
5; T.368 lines 7-25; T.369 lines 1-3.)
29.

After Officer Hartman left the hospital he went back to

the scene to check for debris on the right side of the road.
8

He

found no marks.

However, he did admit that it was possible cars

could have turned into the two driveways and not left marks in the
hour he was at the hospital. He had no way of knowing whether cars
did in fact go on the gravel.

(T.147 lines 4-19; T.156 lines 6-20;

T.158 lines 18-25; T.159 lines 1-18.)
30. Officer Bruce Hartman indicated there were no skid marks
at the scene so there was no evidence of braking.

(T.147 lines 20-

25.)
31.

Finally, officer Hartman testified that he was not an

accident reconstructionist but looks to the physical evidence at
the scene.

This evidence is then submitted

reconstructionist.

to an accident

(T.149 lines 16-25; T.150 lines 1-9.)

32. Val Shupe, plaintiff's accident reconstructionist relied
upon the accident report, the information provided him by Sgt.
Hartman, the depositions of Warren Yarnell and Tina Noonan, Don
Kennedy's statement, visiting the scene, photos, the damage to the
vehicles and the position of the vehicles.

(T.175 lines 2-12;

T.182 lines 7-10; T.185 lines 1-8.)
33. Mr. Shupe testified there were no skid marks at the scene
indicating that Mr. Yarnell had no time to react, when Ms. Noonan
turned in front of him.
34.

(T.184 lines 8-11; T.207 lines 20-25.)

Mr. Shupe also testified he was unable to determine

speeds of the vehicles and therefore could not determine at what
point Ms. Noonan slowed down to 10 to 20 miles per hour to make her
turn.

He had no idea at what point Mr. Yarnell saw Ms. Noonan
9

going 10 miles per hour.

Further, there is no collaboration that

Ms. Noonan turned her signal on a thousand feet prior to the time
of impact other than her own self report.

(T.196 line 25; T.197

line 1; T.205 lines 17-20; T.216 line 25; T.217 lines 1-2; T.207
lines 9-16; T.210 line 25; T.211 lines 1-6; T.210 lines 18-24.)
35. Mr. Shupe also indicated that the point of impact was 76
feet from the driveway Ms. Noonan allegedly was going to turn into.
That in fact she had her turn signal on where there was no
driveway.
36.

(T.218 lines 1-17.)
Mr. Shupe testified that if Ms. Noonan did in fact see

Mr. Yarnell four lengths back from her she could have completed the
turn.

(T217:
37.

lines 12-25.)

Part of his opinion was based on the findings of the

investigating officer who examined the right side of the road and
saw no marks or furrows indicating a car pulled to the right.
However, Ms. Yarnell testified that when her daughter-in-law came
to pick her up she pulled her vehicle onto the right side of the
road.

Mr. Kennedy also parked his semi on the shoulder of the

road.

(T.141 lines 5-8; T.190 lines 20-25; T.369 lines 4-12.)
38. Mr. Shupe admitted that no one really knows if there were

any marks on the right side of the road.

(T.212

lines 14-18.)

39. Mr. Shupe admitted that Ms. Noonan had to make sure that
she could turn safely and that she had a duty to look before she
proceeded to turn.
40.

(T.213 lines 6-19; T.215 lines 2-8.)

Finally, Mr. Shupe testified that if a vehicle were in
10

the process of passing another vehicle and it turned in front of
the passing vehicle there wouldn't be enough time for perception
and reaction to take place and the vehicle turning would constitute
an immediate hazard.

(T.216 lines 16-19.)

41. Mr. Newell Knight defendant's accident reconstructionist
testified

that an accident

evidence at the scene.

investigator gathers the physical

An accident reconstructionist, however,

takes that data and draws conclusions as to how the accident
happened.
42.

(T.379 lines 18-25; T.380 lines 1-25; T.381 line 1.)
Mr. Knight's opinion is based on the accident report,

photographs of the vehicles, repair estimates, damage photographs,
the depositions of Warren Yarnell, Tina Noonan and Val Shupe and
visiting the scene.
43.

(T.381 lines 12-24.)

Mr. Knight testified that the perception as one is

heading northbound on 1900 West is that the wider portion of the
road is on the eastside or the right side of the road. Whereas the
perception on the wests ide or left side of the road is that the
shoulder is very narrow. To document this Mr. Knight showed a film
of the roadway prepared by the Department of Transportation.
(T.385 lines 1-25; T.386 lines 1-21; T.387 lines 19-22; T.395 lines
22-25; T.396 lines 1-3; T.400 lines 13-20; T.402 lines 1-3 and
T.438 lines 15-20.)
44.

Mr. Knight also found that the point of impact was 70

plus feet from the farmhouse driveway.
lines 1-10.)
11

(T.386 lines 22-25; T.387

45.

Mr. Knight examined the photos documenting the damages

and the post-impact position of the vehicles.

Based on these

damage photos Mr. Knight concluded that Ms. Noonan had to have
pulled to the right.

In fact she could not have made a U-turn

without moving to the right.

Further, he testified the most

important piece of evidence is both the damage and lack of damage
shown on the vehicles. He testified that Ms. Noonan would have had
to make a very wide turn for the damage that was shown on her
vehicle. The greatest evidence that she moved to the right was the
physical damage and the angle of collision.

(T.395 lines 10-14;

T.391 lines 19-25; T.392 lines 1-25; T.393 lines 1-25; T.394 lines
1-25; T.406 lines 23-24; T.439 lines 11-25; T.440 lines 1-5; T.441
lines 1-17; T.442 lines 1-25;
46.

T.442 lines 1-2.)

Mr. Knight also testified that if someone is coming

behind you quickly you are going to hold your position your not
going to turn because in the event you do your going to get hit.
(T.390 lines 9-18.)
47.

Finally, Mr. Knight concluded that Ms. Noonan pulled to

the right and turned into the path of the Yarnell vehicle.

(T.390

lines 23-25; T.396 lines 13-18.)
48.

Mr. Knight also concluded that turning in front of a

vehicle that's coming behind you very quickly is not proper.
(T.396 lines 4-10; T.430 lines 4-21; T.431 lines 12-23; T.432 lines
2-25; T.433 lines 1-7.)
49.

With respect to the testimony of Donald Kennedy, the
12

"eyewitness" to the accident, his testimony is quite conflicting as
demonstrated by the statements contained in his sworn statement and
then changed and initialed by him.

Noteworthy is that he told Mr.

and Mrs. Yarnell that he would be a witness for them and told Ms.
Noonan that he would be a witness for her as well.

(T.132 lines

10-19; T.366 lines 13-25; T.367 lines 1-3.)
50. Prior to the trial, proceedings were held in Judge Hyde's
chambers in which plaintiff made a motion in limine and requested
that the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy, an eyewitness to the
accident be excluded.

In making this request plaintiff alleged

that this "sworn statement" was in fact a deposition of which he
had no notice of. Therefore, it should be excluded at trial. (T.7
lines 15-25; T.8 lines 22-25; T.9 lines 11-16.)
51. The court found that the statement of Donald Kennedy was
in fact a "sworn statement" not a deposition, and could be used as
a prior inconsistent statement for the purpose of impeachment only.
(T.8:

lines 22-25; T.9:

lines 1-21; T.10:

lines 5-7.)

The court:
She's not offering it as a
deposition. What she is, if I understand what
she's saying, is if he's going to be a
witness, he's going to testify, and this
statement, apparently she intends to use to
show there are prior inconsistent statements
and that she can do. But only if it comes in
before. She can't use it directly.
(T.9 lines 12-17.)
52.

In the course of trial plaintiff once again objected to

the use of the statement of Donald Kennedy.
13

The court overruled

the objection finding that the statement of Donald Kennedy was not
a deposition and could be used as a prior inconsistent statement.
(T.89 lines 24-25; T.90 lines 1-5.)
53.

After trial of this matter plaintiff again raised the

argument that the statement of Donald Kennedy was a deposition and
not a sworn statement maintaining that because it was taken under
oath and in the presence of a court reporter it was a deposition.
Plaintiff, under objection by defendant, moved the court to publish
this "sworn statement".

(See Exhibit 1 (Reporters Transcript),

page 6 lines 1-4; page 8 lines 5-18; page 9 lines 17-25; page 10
lines 9-14.)
54.

The court published the sworn statement for the limited

purpose of determining whether the statement was a sworn statement
or a deposition

and

for no other purpose.

(See Exhibit 1

(Reporters Transcript), page 11 lines 12-15; page 12 lines 24-25;
page 13 lines 1-13; page 14 lines 14-20.)
55.

In the course of trial officer Hartman the investigating

officer was asked to give an opinion as to fault.

Defendant

objected to the testimony on the basis that officer Hartman was not
an accident reconstructionist and not qualified to testify as to
fault.

The court sustained the objection.

(T.149 lines 16-18;

T.150 lines 5-6, 10-24; T.154 lines 15-20; T.155 lines 2-25; T.156
lines 1-2; T.157 lines 1-4.)
56.

After both sides rested, counsel met in chambers to

discuss jury instructions.

Plaintiffs counsel objected to jury
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instruction 10 being given.

Jury instruction 10 in the pertinent

part states:
A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed
so slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic except when:
(A)
Reduced speed is necessary for safe
operation;
(B) Upon a grade; or
(C)
In compliance with official traffic
control devices. (R.278.)
57.

Plaintiff requested a subsection

instruction which would
turn."
58.

state "When making

(D) be added to the
a proper

left-hand

(T.456 line 16-18.)
The court ruled that jury instruction number 10 could

stand as is.

In making that ruling the court determined that

plaintiff's requested change (the addition of subsection (D) "when
making a proper left-hand turn" was covered by subsection (A) of
jury instruction 10. The court told plaintiff's counsel they could
argue their requested addition in closing argument.

(T.470 lines

17-22; T.472 lines 2-6, 14-17.)
59.

Plaintiff's counsel did in fact argue their requested

version of jury instruction number 10 during closing argument.
(T.515 lines 5-20.)
60.

At the conclusion of trial and on special verdict the

jury determined that Yarnell was negligent, but his negligence was
not the proximate cause of the accident.
61.

(R.346)

The court then entered a judgment based on the special

verdict in favor of defendant Warren Yarnell.
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(R.366)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff's brief addresses four points on appeal.

Point I

deals with the issue of whether the evidence supports the verdict.
In addressing that issue Utah Case Law is clear that plaintiff has
the burden of marshalling the evidence and showing that the
evidence and the inferences therefrom presented in a light most
favorable to the prevailing party, was insufficient to support the
verdict.

Plaintiff has failed to do so. This being the case the

appellate court assumes the record supports the findings of the
trial court and proceeds to review the accuracy of the lower
court's conclusions of law and application of that law.
Point II of plaintiff's brief addresses the issue of whether
jury instruction 10 was confusing or misleading and whether it was
appropriate

for

the

court

to

exclude

supplement to jury instruction 10.

plaintiff's

requested

The basis for defendant's

argument is that the instruction requested by plaintiff is already
incorporated

in and is part of jury instruction 10 and jury

instruction 9. Therefore, the court properly excluded defendant's
requested addition to jury instruction 10.
Point III of plaintiff's brief dealt with excluding the
investigating officers testimony as to fault.

It is defendant's

position that Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225 (Ut. App. 1991) and
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Ut. App.
1991), are two cases on point which hold an investigating officer
or accident reconstructionist cannot testify as to a legal opinion.
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Therefore, the trial court properly excluded the testimony of
plaintiff's investigating officer regarding his opinion as to
fault.

Further, the investigating officer admitted he was not an

accident reconstruction!st and his testimony was properly excluded
on this basis as well.
Finally, plaintiff in Point IV of her brief argued that the
statement of Donald Kennedy taken by defendant was a deposition
that she was not given notice of.
record

supports that this was

Defendant maintains and the

in fact

a

"sworn

statement".

Further, defendant maintains that a statement taken under oath and
in the presence of a court reporter does not make it a deposition.
This sworn statement for the purposes of the hearsay rule is
considered a prior inconsistent statement.
can be used for impeachment.

This being the case it

Defendant maintains that he properly

used it to impeach the witness.

By definition if you attack a

witnesses credibility this is going to be prejudicial to the
adverse party.

Probative value is not the issue.

Defendant in Point V of his brief maintains that this appeal
filed by plaintiff for the reasons stated above, is a frivolous
appeal designed

to harass defendant

and defense

counsel, to

increase legal fees and to use up the court's time.

For this

reason, defendant has requested he receive attorney's fees and
costs pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
and Rule 34 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT RULED APPROPRIATELY IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR A NEW TRIAL.
Plaintiff should not be granted a new trial just because she
is dissatisfied with the jury's verdict. This is clearly reflected
in Argument Point I of her brief.

Rather, "A new trial may

properly be granted only when the jury's verdict is manifestly
against the weight of the evidence'.'1 Price-Orem Inv. v. Rollins,
Brown & Gunnel 1, 713 P.2d 55, 58 (Utah 1986).

Further, "An

appellate court does not lightly disturb the verdict of a jury nor
the findings of fact made by a trial court."
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).

Saunders v. Sharp,

In the event appellant challenges

the jury's findings then "appellant must marshall all evidence in
favor of the facts as found by the trial court and then demonstrate
that even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings
of fact."

Saunders, supra 199.

Specifically, "they must set out

in their briefs, with record references, all the evidence that
supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to that
effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people would not conclude
that the evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v. Gibson Products
Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991).

Finally, if the appellant

fails to marshall the evidence, the appellate court assumes the
record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to
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review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law in the case.

Saunders, supra, Id., 199.

Plaintiff has failed to "marshal1 the evidence and demonstrate
the evidence is insufficient to support the findings of fact.11
Rather, all she has done is attempt to argue that "proximate cause"
is a question of law and therefore the appellate court should find
in her favor. However, as a general rule, (Except in very limited
circumstances

not present

here.

i.e.

Mitchell

v. Pearson

Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985), to allow the jury to decide
the issue of proximate cause would allow them to speculate.)
proximate cause is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
Watters v. Ouerry, 626 P.2d 455 (Utah 1981); Harris v Utah Transit
Authority, 671 P.2d 217 (Utah 1983).
Clearly, then "for [plaintiff to overturn the jury verdict]
she must set out in her [brief], with record references, all the
evidence that supports the verdict, including all valid inferences
to that effect, and demonstrate that reasonable people would not
conclude that the evidence supports the verdict." Hodges v. Gibson
Products Co. , 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991).

In that light the

Utah Supreme Court also stated:
We emphasize that it is counsel's professional
duty to analyze the evidence with care and
provide record citations for every asserted
factual proposition. It is not the duty of an
appellate court in a civil case to canvass the
record on its own to determine the sufficiency
of the evidence. Id. 156.
Noonan has failed to adequately and appropriately "marshall
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the evidence".

She clearly has not presented the "evidence that

supports the verdict, including all valid inferences to that
effect.

..."

Hodaes. Id. 156. To that end the appellate court

should support the findings of the trial court and proceed to
review the accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the
application of that law.

Saunders, 199.

Viewing the evidence as outlined in defendant's statement of
facts in the light most favorable to the verdict it is clear that
the evidence does in fact support the jury verdict.

It follows

then that the district court ruled appropriately

in denying

plaintiff's request for a new trial. Plaintiff has failed to meet
the burden of showing that the jury verdict was "manifestly against
the weight of evidence". Therefore, plaintiff's request for a new
trial should be denied.
II.
THE COURT PROPERLY ALLOWED THE SUBMISSION OF
JURY INSTRUCTION 10.
Under Utah Law, an improper jury instruction is grounds for
"reversible error 'if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice
of the complaining party.,M

Davidson v. Prince. 813 P.2d 1225,

1230 (Utah App. 1991).
Jury instruction number 10 in the pertinent part provides:
(R.278)
A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a
speed so slow as to impede or block the normal
and reasonable movement of traffic except
when:
20

A. Reduced speed is necessary for safe
operation;
B. Upon a grade; or
C. In compliance with official traffic
control devices.
This section is taken verbatim out of the Motor Vehicle Code
§ 41-6-49.

Plaintiff has requested that a "subsection D". be

added to the last paragraph of the instruction which would state:
"When making a proper left-hand turn."
456 lines 16-18)

(T:

As a basis for her argument plaintiff referred to U.C.A. § 416-55(3).

(T.455: lines 24-25.)

That section provides in the

pertinent part:
The overtaking and passing of vehicles
proceeding in the same direction is subject to
the following provisions: . . .
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in
the same direction, the operator of a vehicle
traveling in a left lane shall, upon being
overtaken by another vehicle in the same lane,
yield to the overtaking vehicle by moving
safely to the right, and may not impede the
movement or free flow of traffic in a left
lane except:
(A) When preparing to turn left; . . .
This section, however, does not apply because 1900 West is
"not a highway having more than one lane in the same direction."
1900 West is a two lane road, with one lane in each direction.
(T.54 lines 11-13, 25; T.63 lines 12-16; T.130 lines 9-12; T.458
lines 4-5.)
Further, in her brief Ms. Noonan has misrepresented what the
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court's findings were with respect to jury instruction 10. In the
final analysis, plaintiff was not clear as to what the court's
ruling was.

This was demonstrated by the interchange which took

place as follows:
Mr. Johnson:
Your Honor, I'm a little bit
unsure now what you decided on that.
The Court: I nave decided that in effect it's
covered by reducing speed to what's necessary
for the safe operation of the vehicle because
the safe operation of the left turn would
require less speed. It is therefore covered
and you may argue it.
(T.471 line 25; T.472 lines 2-6.)
In essence plaintiff is arguing that the jury needs to be made
aware that it is appropriate for an individual to slow down to
negotiate a left turn.

Not only is this argument covered by

subsection A of the third paragraph of jury instruction 10 as well
as jury instruction 9 (R.277) but it is common sense.

This was

also pointed out by the court when the court stated that it is
obvious that an individual making a left turn needs to slow down
before making that turn and it is not possible to make a left turn
at 55 miles an hour.

(T.471 lines 11-14.)

Jury instruction 9 also covers this issue wherein it states in
the pertinent part:

(R.277)

It is the duty of every driver to use
reasonable care to avoid danger.
In that
regard, every driver is obliged:
5. To stop or suddenly slow down only
after observing that it can be done safely
and,
if
an
opportunity
exists,
after
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signaling.
Further, plaintiff was allowed to argue his requested addition
to jury instruction 10 in closing argument, which he did.

(T.515

lines 5-19.)
In further support of her argument plaintiff's attorney relies
on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Nielsen v. Pioneer Valley
Hospital, 830 P.2d 270 (Utah 1992). However, this case is clearly
distinguishable

from

the

present

case.

Nielsen

v.

Pioneer

Hospital, Supra. involved a situation where plaintiff Nielsen was
admitted to defendant Pioneer Valley Hospital for knee surgery.
She had a history of dental problems during the previous year and
had undergone significant dental work.

Approximately two hours

after her surgery was done and she was in the recovery room a nurse
discovered that several of Nielsen's teeth were broken and her
bridge work was damaged.

Nielsen subsequently brought an action

against both the doctor and the hospital.
An issue arose as to the jury instructions.

One set of jury

instructions dealt with the legal theories of negligence and res
ipsa loquitur.

In this regard the court found that these were

rather involved negligence theories and that nowhere was the jury
ever told that the negligence instruction did not apply if the res
ipsa loquitur elements as set out in that instruction were found to
exist.
The court found another set of jury instructions even more
misleading in that they gave conflicting instructions with respect
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to using a professional standard of care versus a common knowledge
standard of care.
other.

These instructions directly contradicted each

The court in these circumstances found that plaintiff was

denied a fair trial.
Clearly, the same type of confusion does not exist in the
present case.

It does not involve complex legal theories or

contradictory instructions and hence confusing jury instructions
like in Nielsen.

Rather, the present case involves a question of

whether the failure to give plaintiff's request addition to jury
instruction 10 prejudices her case.

It is clear from the facts

plaintiff has not been prejudice. Jury instruction 10 does in fact
in subsection A provide that an individual may slow down so as to
impede the flow of traffic "when reduced speed is necessary for
safe operation".

Jury instruction 9 also instructs the jury that

an individual can stop or suddenly slow down only after observing
that it can be done safely and signaling where possible.

Finally,

it is common sense that an individual can slow down to make a left
turn.

In Nielsen,

Supra. the jury

instructions

conflicting, confusing, and fairly technical.

were quite

This could not be

said about jury instruction 10 that plaintiff is now objecting to.
Finally, "it is not prejudicial error to fail to use specific
instructions if the substance of the requested instruction is
covered in the instructions given."
80, 82

(Utah 1987).

Joraensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d

It is clear in the present case that

plaintiff's requested addition to jury instruction 10 was in fact
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given

in "subsection A" of jury instruction

10 and

in jury

instruction 9.
Further, "failure to give the requested jury instruction is
reversible error if it tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice
of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises
the jury on the law."

Joraensen, Id. 82 and cases cited therein.

See also Davidson v Prince, supra; Hall v. Blackman, 417 P.2d 664,
667 (Utah 1966) (where there must be some showing that the error
was substantial and prejudicial.)

Crookston v. Fire Insurance

Exchangef 817 P.2d 789 (Ut. 1991).
It is clear that plaintiff has not met the burden of showing
that the failure to add "subsection D." to jury instruction 10 was
a substantial error and prejudicial to his client.
covered by other instructions.

It is clearly

Further, it is common sense that

one must slow down before making any turn. There is absolutely no
confusion in the failure to add "subsection D". Further, the motor
vehicle provision plaintiff relies on to add "subsection D." does
not apply in this case in that this was not a four lane highway or
a highway with two lanes in each direction.

Rather, it was a one

lane highway in each direction.
At

most

if

the

court's

failure

to

give

the

requested

instruction is anything, which we maintain the instruction was
appropriate, it is harmless error and is not grounds for a new
trial.
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III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
IN EXCLUDING THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S
TESTIMONY AS TO FAULT.
In the course of plaintiff's case, Sgt. Bruce Hartman, the
investigating officer was called to testify regarding defendant's
fault.

(T.149 lines 1-5; T.155 line 25; T.156 lines 1-25; and

T.157 line 1.)

Defendant entered an objection and requested to

voir dire the witness who admitted that he was not an accident
reconstructionist.

He testified that his duty is to investigate

the physical evidence at the scene.
investigators

then

reconstructionist.

send

their

He also testified that most
data

to

an

accident

(T.149 lines 16-25; T.150 lines 1-9.)

court sustained the objection.

The

Clearly, Mr. Hartman was not

qualified to render an opinion as to fault or cause of this
collision and his testimony in this regard was properly excluded.
Assuming, he was qualified, he would still not be able to
testify as to cause or fault of the accident for the reason that it
calls for a legal opinion and such determinations are left to the
jury.

Nelson

v.

Truiillo,

657

P.2d

730, 733

(Utah

1987)

Steffensen v. Smiths Management Corporation, 820 P.2d 482, 491
(Utah App. 1991); Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231 (Utah
App. 1991).
On appeal plaintiff argues that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by excluding Mr. Hartman's testimony because it
was allowed under Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 702. However, Rule
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702 just provides the basis for an expert's testimony but does not
address the issue of whether an expert can give an opinion as to
the ultimate issue,

i.e. fault. The appropriate rule of evidence

is Rule 704.
In reviewing challenges to evidentiary rulings, the appellate
court "give[s] deference to the trial court's advantageous position
and [does not] overturn the result unless it is clear that the
trial court erred."

Whitehead v. American Motor Sales Corp., 801

P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990).
Further, plaintiff has the burden of showing the evidence
excluded could have influenced the jury to render a different
verdict.

Anton v. Thomas, 806 P.2d 744, 746 (Utah App. 1991).

Davidson v. Prince, supra, is a case on point.

Noteworthy,

plaintiff cited this case elsewhere in his brief but did not point
out the case to the court, a case which is contrary to his
position.

In Davidson, their accident reconstruction expert was

called to testify regarding defendant's negligence.

Plaintiff's

counsel asked their reconstruction expert if he had an opinion
regarding

defendant's

negligence.

responded affirmatively.

The

reconstruction

expert

He was then asked to express his opinion

and defendant's counsel objected on the grounds that the question
pertained to an ultimate issue to be decided by the jury.
trial court sustained defendant's objection.
argued

that

the

trial

court

committed

The

On appeal plaintiff

prejudicial

error by

excluding the reconstructionist testimony because such opinion
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testimony is admissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 704.
The

Davidson

court

acknowledged

that

expert

testimony

regarding the ultimate issue is admissible under Rule 704.
Rules of Evidence, Rule 704 states:

Utah

"Testimony in the form of an

opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable
because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of
fact."
The appellate court, however, affirmed the trial court's
exclusion of the accident reconstructionist testimony as to fault
on the grounds that it was a legal conclusion.
that

Rule

704

"abolishes

the per

se rule

They pointed out
against

testimony

regarding ultimate issues of fact, it does not allow all opinions."
Id. 1231

The appellate court then referred to the Advisory

Committee notes to Rule 704 which made clear that "questions which
would merely allow the witness to tell the jury what result to
reach are not permitted.

Nor is the rule intended to allow a

witness to give legal conclusions." Omen v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 698
F.2d 236, 240 (Fifth Circuit, 1983).

The appellate court thus

concluded that an "expert generally cannot give an opinion as to
whether an individual was "negligent" because such an opinion would
require a legal conclusion."

Xd. 1231

More specifically, in Davidson, the accident reconstructionist
was allowed to give his an opinion as to "the reason appellees
truck overturned while going around a curve, that the truck was
traveling too fast for the curve, what the speed limit was at the
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curve, whether a person hauling livestock should be concerned with
his load and what the concerns should be, and whether a person
hauling livestock could foresee the possibility of injury if the
truck overturned."

Id. 1231.

The only evidence the trial court

excluded was the accident reconstructionist's conclusions regarding
fault.

The appellate

court

further pointed

out

that

,f

[The

reconstructionist's] testimony was not technical or difficult to
understand, but was expressed in lay terms.

The trial judge did

not err in excluding [the reconstructionist's] opinion testimony
that appellee was negligent. The excluded testimony was an answer
to a specific question which would appear on the verdict form, a
question which must be answered based upon the judge's definition
of a legal term "negligence".

Questions which allow a witness to

simply tell the jury what result to reach are not permitted."
1231.

Id.

The court further stated that:
"Given
that
[the
reconstructionist's]
testimony was easily understandable and that
[the reconstructionist] was allowed to testify
as to everything except his final conclusion
that appellee was negligent, the testimony was
properly excluded as the jury was capable of
drawing its own conclusions from the evidence
presented and after instruction from the
court." Id. 1232.

Similarly in the present case there was nothing technically
difficult about the testimony of Sgt. Hartman.
is a very simple automobile accident.

In fact, the case

Sgt. Hartman was allowed to

testify as to the point of impact, the observed path of travel and
the final resting place and position of the vehicles following the
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impact.

(T.144 lines 11-21; T.147 lines 4-24; T.152 line 25; T.153

lines 1-15; T.157 lines 8-25; T.158 lines 1-13; T.159 lines 2-13;
lines 19-22; T.160 lines 18-25; T.161, lines 1-2.) Officer Hartman
was also asked his opinion as to the cause or fault in this
accident. That was properly objected to and the evidence properly
excluded as calling for a legal opinion.

As the Utah Appellate

Court stated in Davidson v. Prince. Supra. and later in Steffensen
v. Smiths Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 491, (Ut. App. 1991) it
is the province of the jury to assess negligence and apportion
fault. The jurors are given a special verdict form which addresses
these very issues.
Therefore, it follows then that the court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding the investigating officer's testimony as to
fault.
IV.
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
FINDING THE SWORN STATEMENT OF DONALD KENNEDY
TO BE A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT.
Plaintiff is still under the misconception that the statement
taken of Donald Kennedy, the eyewitness, was a deposition.
clearly was not a deposition but a sworn statement.

This

Mr. Kennedy

was contacted regarding his statement. He voluntarily came forward
as an independent witness, offered to have his sworn statement
taken, and in fact offered to do so at his place of residence.
(R.490-499).

In fact Mr. Kennedy was sent notice confirming with

him that his sworn statement would be taken on November 7, 1991, at
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4:30 p.m. at his home.
The

final

(R.496).

document

produced

was

inadvertently

entitled

deposition by the court reporter on the cover of what was clearly
a sworn statement. The court reporter then submitted an affidavit
demonstrating this defect.

(R.499).

Apparently, plaintiff does not see a difference between a
sworn statement and a deposition and in fact admitted so.
lines 23-25).

(T.7

A statement of an independent witness can be taken

in many different ways.

Plaintiff fails to see that a statement

can be taken by writing the statement and having the witness sign
it, by recording the statement and transcribing it or in the manner
in which it was done, using the court reporter to take down the
testimony.

The fact a court reporter is present and the witness

put under oath does not make it a deposition as plaintiff would
have you believe.

(T.7 lines 23-25; T.8

line 1; Exhibit 1

Reporter's Transcript) page 7 lines 11-18; page 9 lines 22-24; page
12 lines 3-7.)

In this regard the court stated:

The Court: You can do that, you can use any
statement of any . . oral, written, under
oath, not under oath, whatever. So long as
it's a prior statement. The fact that it was
taken under oath does not make it a
deposition.
Exhibit No. 1 (Reporters Transcript) page 12 lines 3-6.
Plaintiff did file a motion in limine prior to trial.

In

regard to that motion the court aptly noted the use of Mr.
Kennedy's sworn statement was a prior inconsistent statement (for
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impeachment) and not to be used as direct evidence or to prove the
truth of the matter asserted.

(T.9 lines 1-4). Clearly, pursuant

to the court's ruling it was not to be used as a deposition for
direct testimony but only as a prior inconsistent statement for
impeachment purposes, a fact plaintiff does not understand and
chooses to ignore.

Specifically, the court found:

The Court:
She's not offering it as a
deposition. What she is, if I understand what
she's saying, is if he's going to be a
witness, he's going to testify, and this
statement, apparently she intends to use to
show there are prior inconsistent statements
in it and that she can do. But only if it
comes in before. She can't use it directly.
(T.9 lines 12-17).
There is no doubt that this is a sworn statement and not a
deposition.

This being the case a sworn statement is hearsay and

therefore cannot be used to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
Basically, a sworn statement can be used to impeach the witness,
which was done in this case.

(Exhibit 1 (Reporters Transcript)

page 7 lines 21-23; page 8 lines 5-8; page 9 lines 2-7, 17-20; page
11 lines 24-25; page 13 lines 22-23.)
Specifically, of the Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801 states
that a statement is hearsay.

Subsection c provides:

"Hearsay is

a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter

asserted."

Subsection

d goes

on

to

describe

those

circumstances in which statements are not hearsay and one of those
circumstances is when used as a prior inconsistent statement on
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cross-examination to impeach a witness. Specifically Utah Rules of
Evidence Rule 801 (d)(1) states as follows:
(d)
Statements which are not hearsay.
statement is not hearsay if:

A

(1) Prior statement by witness.
The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing
and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement and the statement is (A)
inconsistent with his testimony or the witness
denies having made the statement or has
forgotten, . . .
It follows then under Rule 801(d)(1) that the statement taken
of Donald Kennedy can be used as a prior inconsistent statement for
impeachment.
In a subsequent hearing after the trial which is entitled
Reporter's Transcript and attached as Exhibit 1 plaintiff made a
motion to have the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy made a part of
the record. Defendant objected to that motion maintaining that it
should not be made part of the record since it was a prior
inconsistent statement used to impeach and not direct evidence.
The court found that the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy could be
used for the limited purpose of having it before the appellate
court so they could make a determination as to whether it was a
sworn statement or a deposition and

for that purpose only.

(Exhibit 1 Reporter's Transcript page 12 lines 13-14, 23-25; page
13 lines 1-4; page 14 lines 14-20).
Note that the sworn statement consists of the transcribed
testimony of Donald Kennedy at the time this statement was taken
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and changes to the statement initialed by him.

Mr. Kennedy made

significant changes to the sworn statement and these were asked
about at the time of trial for the purpose of impeaching his
testimony and attacking his credibility.

(T:

85, lines 12-15).

Noteworthy is that these changes were made in Mr. Durbano's
office in the presence of Mr. Johnson.

(T:

85, lines 16-23).

On all the changes Mr. Kennedy made he basically responded
that he would have to review the police report to "jog his memory".
(T.86 lines 5-8).
As part of plaintiff's argument to exclude the evidence she is
now arguing that the statement of Donald Kennedy including the
changes should not have been admitted for the reason that its
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice and by its tendency to mislead and confuse the
jury.

This is the first time they have raised this issue, i.e.,

that the prejudicial effect outweighs the probative value.
It is fair to say that any time an individual is attempting to
impeach the direct testimony of an eyewitness using a prior
inconsistent

statement

prejudicial effect.

it

is going to by definition

have a

If the statement is contrary to the statement

initially made by the witness it does have a prejudicial effect, it
impacts his credibility.

This is the purpose that the sworn

statement was used, to attack Mr. Kennedy's credibility.

The

probative value of the testimony was not at issue. Rather, what is
at

issue

is the use

of a prior
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inconsistent

statement

for

impeachment purposes and not for the truth of the matter asserted.
Defendant was trying to show that Mr. Kennedy has no credibility,
not that what he said is in fact true.
Prior to beginning the sworn statement Mr. Kennedy was advised
that he would have an opportunity to review the statement and make
any changes. He was also advised as to the ramification of making
those changes in that they could be used to impeach him at the time
of trial.

(T.88. lines 15-23.)

In plaintiff's brief he alleges that Mr. Kennedy was not
allowed to review the police report for more than a few minutes.
This

is the testimony

according to Mr. Kennedy.

On cross-

examination Mr. Kennedy was asked as follows:
Q: . . . but in these changes you wrote, for
the majority of them, is it not true, that I
would have to read the police report, isn't
that true, to refresh my memory?
A: Sure, after I reviewed the police report,
sure, I can make changes.
Q: Yes, that's what you said, but the fact of
the matter is, you did review the police
report, you did review your statement, and you
did all that, and then when we went back on
the record and I asked you questions. Do you
recall that?
A:

Yes I do.

(T.86 lines 5-14).
Further, Mr. Kennedy was given an opportunity to review the
police report and then questions were asked with respect to that
police report.

One such question dealt with the issue of who was
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at fault.

The interchange occurred as follows:
Q: . . . You just read your statement and I
asked you, . . . do you ever recall . . .
saying to the officer one particular driver
was at fault and they should be cited?
A: No. I just said it was obvious who was at
fault to me.
Q: . . . Do you still remember finding that
it was the first vehicle that was at fault,
the one who made the left turn at fault? And
you originally put yes. This was after you
read your police report, after you read your
statement, do you remember this?
A:

No, I don't.

Q: It's written down here, isn't it? It's on
page 24, line 8. Is that the question you
were asked and is that how you answered it?
A:

Apparently.

(T.86 lines 19-25; T.87 lines 1-11)
He then states on page 87, lines 20-21 that we went off the
record so many times he didn't know when we were off and when we
were on the record.

However, in looking at the record the only

time it indicates we went off the record was on page 24, line 17.
It is clear from the changes that Mr. Kennedy made that they
were material changes to the original testimony.
completely

contradicted

his

initial

In fact, they

testimony.

demonstrated by the following:
Q:

Did you ever see any brake lights?

A: No. But it did slow down, I'm sure it was
so obvious that the guy swung clear to the
right like he was going to make a right-hand
turn and then came back to the left. Do you

This

is

remember saying that?
A:

Sure.

Q: Okay. Do you remember making the change,
that's all I recall now, but without reviewing
the accident report I couldn't say for sure.
Do you remember writing that in there?
A:

Yes I remember writing.

Q: Do you remember reviewing the accident
report?
A:

Uh, huh.

(T.91 lines 24-25; T.92 lines 1-13).
Q:

. . . So she then swung to the right?

A: Yes. And then you changed it. That's
what I remember, but without seeing the
accident report, my memory's a bit hazy. You
saw the accident report, didn't you?
Your
answer?
A:

Yes.

(T.92 lines 19-25).
Q: . . . then I asked you on line 24, how far
off the roadway did she get, do you know?
A: I think she crossed the white line, that
her tires crossed the white line. It was far
enough for me to think, well, she was
obviously going to make a right-hand turn. Do
you remember answering that?
A:

No.

Q:

But it's written down here isn't it?

A:

Uh, huh.

Q:

So you must have said it?

A:

I must have, sure.
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Q: Do you remember changing it to say instead
of I know, you changed it to I think, and
then, without reviewing the accident report
and jogging my memory, I couldn't be sure, but
what I recall right now is that.
Do you
remember writing that?
A:

Uh, huh.

Q:
Do you remember writing it in Mr.
Durbano's office with Mr. Johnson present?
A:

no response.

(T.92 line 25; T.93 lines 2-20).
Q: . . . Then turn to page 12, line three.
Question, Okay.
Now, when you say she was
going to make a right-hand turn, where she was
going to turn right. . . Answer:
I don't
know.
That's what got me, whether she was
going to pull off the road on the shoulder or
what, and I'm pretty sure she was going to
pull off the right-hand side because she did
go off past the white line and then came back
and made a left-hand turn. Do you remember
telling me that?
A:

Sure.

Q:
Do you remember changing that and the
change being, I don't know, that's . . .
A:
Because that whole thing's totally
backwards. I had to change it to make any
context out of the thing.
(T.93 lines 24-25; T.94 lines 1-9).
Q: . . . Then we return to page 13, line 8.
Then apparently she decided she was going to
make a left-hand turn. Apparently she just
swung way wide to make a left-hand turn, is
what it was, and the guy behind her was
mistaken that she was going to pull off the
road or make a right-hand turn off the road
and went to go around her in the left-hand
lane and she swung wide enough and made a
left-hand turn, and he just broad sided her
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and turned her.
The changes were, then
apparently she decided she's going to make a
left-hand turn. Apparently, I'm thinking is
what you added, she just swung way wide to
make a left-hand turn, and I'm thinking the
guy behind her was mistaken. And then once
again, without reviewing my prior statement, I
can't be sure. . . . And up to the time you
got your . . . this whole thing interlineated
this way, isn't it?
A:

Uh, huh.

Q: . . . even assuming the facts as you wrote
them here, okay, and that is that there are
two north bound cars, the first signaled for a
left turn and in this report you didn't say
when she signaled, you don't know when she
signaled, do you? She could have signaled,
the first car could have signaled that second
or been signaling, as we sit here today, you
don't know.
A:

I couldn't tell.

Clearly, from some of the aforementioned sections of the sworn
statement that were used to impeach Mr. Kennedy it is clear that
they were statements contradicting his original testimony.

In his

original testimony he indicated that plaintiff had pulled to the
right and then turned left in front of Mr. Yarnell.

Subsequently,

in the presence of Mr. Johnson, plaintiff's attorney, changes were
made to that statement which indicated he needed to see the police
report to "jog his memory".

He was then shown the police report

and after reviewing it he still had a recollection of plaintiff's
vehicle moving to the right.

(T.92 line 1; T.93, lines 1-11).

When he testified at the time of trial it was obvious that he
had changed his entire testimony from that of the sworn statement.
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Clearly, then, defendant was using the sworn statement as a prior
inconsistent statement to impeach Mr. Kennedy's testimony. One can
only expect that when a witness completely changes his testimony
that this will have a prejudicial effect on the jury. However, the
issue as to the substance of this testimony was never reached by
using

the

sworn

statement.

Rather,

it was

credibility and in essence make him a non-witness.

to

attack

his

Therefore, it

is not necessary to get into the issue whether the probative value
outweighs the prejudicial effect or whether the statement was
confusing or misleading to the jury. The purpose was to show that
Mr. Kennedy lacked credibility, and that purpose was apparently
achieved by the jury's verdict.
As to the allegation on page 28 of plaintiff's brief that
during the sworn statement there was testimony that was offered but
never recorded.

We would refer the court to the sworn statement,

page 27, line 17, where there was only one occasion of going off
the record.

The document speaks for itself and it is clear we did

not go on and off the record as Mr. Kennedy would have one believe.
(T.87:

lines 20-21.)

With regard to the remaining character

accusations contained in plaintiff's brief, specifically on pages
28 and 29, there is no evidence to substantiate that and quite
frankly personal attacks have no place in the judicial system and
clearly not in an appellate brief.
With respect to plaintiff's attorney citing Rule 3.4 of the
Utah Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorney's which in essence
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provides that an attorney shall not "unlawfully obstruct another's
parties access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal
a document or other material having potential evidentiary value."
It is clear that this did not take place.

Mr. Durbano and Mr.

Johnson had every opportunity to contact Mr. Kennedy. They in fact
did contact him and in Mr. Johnson's presence made the changes to
the sworn statement.

This was a sworn statement and there is no

rule that states that a party cannot take a statement of an
eyewitness in the form and manner which was done in this case,
under oath and in the presence of a court reporter.

There is

absolutely not one shred of evidence that there was any undue
influence and quite frankly the character assassination does not
belong

in

this

appellate

brief

and

of

review

is

not

worth

the

time

addressing.
Finally,

the

standard

with

respect

to

the

admissibility of evidence such as the statement of Donald Kennedy
is that "deference is given to the trial courts advantageous
position; thus, that court's ruling regarding admissibility will
not be overturned unless it clearly appears that the lower court
was in error." Whitehead v. American Motors Sales Corp.. 801 P.2d
920, 923 (Utah 1990).

It is clear that the lower court's finding

that the statement of Donald Kennedy was not a deposition but a
statement and could be used as a prior inconsistent statement to
impeach was an appropriate ruling. It is also clear that the court
would only allow the statement for impeachment purposes. Further,
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plaintiff had a copy of the sworn statement, had talked to Mr.
Kennedy, had been there at the time the changes were made and could
have elected not to call Mr. Kennedy as a witness which would have
precluded the use of the sworn statement. Defendant had absolutely
nothing to do with plaintiff's decision to call Mr. Kennedy.
Defendant does have the right, however, to attack the credibility
of the witness and by definition this will be prejudicial to the
plaintiff's case.
Therefore, it appears that the trial court ruled appropriately
in allowing the sworn statement of Donald Kennedy to be used as a
prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes. It follows
then that there was no reversible error and plaintiff is not
entitled to a new trial.
V.
FILING A FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS.

IS GROUNDS

FOR

This appeal is frivolous, therefore defendant is entitled to
costs plus reasonable attorney's fees.

Rule 33(a) of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure state that attorney's fees may be
awarded when the "motion made or appeal taken under these rules is
either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just damages, which
may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or
reasonable attorney's fees, to the prevailing party. The court may
order that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's
attorney."
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Utah Rules of Appellate, Rule 33(b) defines a frivolous appeal
as follows:
. . .A frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper is one that is not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any
improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation,
or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal, motion, brief or other
paper.
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 40(a) also defines a
frivolous appeal as one having no reasonable legal or factual
basis.

Rule 40(a) states:
Every motion, brief, and other paper of a
party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record who
is an active member in good standing of the
Bar of this state. The attorney shall sign
his or her individual name and give his or her
business address, telephone number and Utah
State Bar number. . . . The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate
that the attorney or party has read the
motion, brief, or other paper; that to the
best of his or her knowledge, information, and
belief, formed after reasonable inquiry, it is
not frivolous or interposed for the purpose of
delay as defined in Rule 33.
. . .
If a
motion, brief, or other paper is signed in
violation of this rule, the authority and the
procedures of this court provided by Rule 33
shall apply.

The court in O'Brien v. Rush. 744 P.2d 306, 310

(Ut. App.

1987) determined that "[a]n appeal brought for delay is one marked
by dilatory conduct or conduct designed to mislead the court and
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which benefits only the appellant."
Further, Black's Law Dictionary 601 (5th Edition 1979) defines
a frivolous appeal as "[o]ne in which no justiciable question has
been presented and appeal is readily recognizable as devoid of
merit in that there is little prospect that it can ever succeed."
Defendant need only raise this issue in his brief and this
will constitute notice.

Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 417 (Utah

1990).
The court in Porco v. Porco, 752 P.2d 365, 369 (Ut. App.,
1988) recognized that "sanctions for frivolous appeals should only
be applied in egregious cases, lest there be an improper chilling
of the right to appeal erroneous lower court decisions.

However,

sanctions should be imposed when "an appeal is obviously without
any merit and has been taken with no reasonable likelihood of
prevailing, and results in delayed implementation of the judgment
of the lower court; increased costs of litigation; dissipation of
the time and resources of the Law Court."
The court in Hunt v. Hurst, Supra, addressed the effect
sanctions would have in filing appeals.

In this regard the court

stated:
We do not believe or intend that the
litigation of new or uncertain issues will be
chilled by imposing sanctions on attorneys who
pursue what in reality are nuisance claims and
do so in an unlawyer-like fashion by writing
an unprofessional brief and relying on
improper materials and arguments in the brief.
Id. 417
*
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Applying the above analysis to this case it is clear that
plaintiff has filed an appeal that is without merit, specifically,
to harass defendant

and defense

counsel

and to prevent the

implementation of the judgment of the lower court. Further, it is
clear that plaintiff has prepared her brief in an unlawyer-like
fashion by "writing an unprofessional brief and relying on improper
materials and argument in the brief."
Specifically, plaintiff alleged in Point I of her brief that
the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict.

This being

the case plaintiff had a duty to marshall the evidence. Plaintiff
failed to do so.

Plaintiff has cited from the record but has not

pointed to particular sections or line numbers in support of her
contentions, or demonstrated to the court the inferences that can
be drawn.

In addition, she has failed to show the evidence in a

light most favorable to the verdict entered.

Defendant refers you

to his brief, Statement of Facts, where such evidence has in fact
been demonstrated to show that the evidence does properly support
the verdict.

In Point II of Plaintiff's brief he argues that it

was prejudicial not to include the addition he requested to jury
instruction 10. However, it was clear that jury instruction 10 in
subsection (A) as well as jury instruction 9 basically gave the
very same information.

Point III of plaintiff's brief dealt with

the exclusion of the expert's testimony as to fault.

In this

regard, plaintiff has failed to cite two Utah Appellate Court cases
on point.

Davidson v. Prince, Supra., and Steffensen v. Smith's
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Management Corp.. Supra.

Interestingly, Plaintiff cited Davidson

v Prince, Supra. in her brief for the purpose of showing the
standard of review. However, this case was not argued in Point III
of her brief for the reason it was contrary to her position.
Davidson v. Prince, Supra. makes it clear that it was proper to
exclude the testimony of the investigating officer as to fault.
Finally, plaintiff's conduct under Point IV of his brief is
particularly egregious.

Point IV dealt with the issue of whether

the statement of Donald Kennedy was in fact a sworn statement or a
deposition.

It is clear that plaintiff has a misconception as to

what a deposition is.

The fact a sworn statement is taken under

oath and in the presence of a court reporter does not make it a
deposition. Further, plaintiff cites no case law in support of his
position. Rather than rely on legal precedent he has behaved in an
unlawyerly-like fashion by accusing defense counsel of improper
conduct which is unsubstantiated and is not part of the appellate
record.

His accusations with respect to defense counsel have no

basis in the judicial system much less in this appellate brief. He
has clearly behaved

in an unprofessional manner and this is

reflected in Point IV of his brief.
In sum, then the four issues plaintiff has raised on appeal
are without merit and were done to specifically harass defendant
and defense counsel, to increase the cost of litigation, and to
increase the use of the courts time.
It is clear from the issues plaintiff has dealt with in her
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brief that she has in fact filed a frivolous appeal.

This being

the case, defendant now requests that he receive double costs and
reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Rules 33 and 34 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
CONCLUSIONS
Based on the foregoing, defendant Warren Yarnell requests the
court rule as a general proposition and as a matter of law:
1.

That plaintiff has failed to marshall the evidence and

show that the evidence and the inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party is insufficient to support
the verdict. Further, defendant requests that the court find that
the evidence and the inferences therefrom do in fact support the
verdict and on this basis plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial;
2. Jury instruction 10 was not confusing or misleading. Jury
instruction 10 coupled with jury instruction 9 did in fact contain
plaintiff's requested jury instruction and therefore there is no
"reversible error";
3.

The trial court didn't abuse its discretion in excluding

the testimony of the investigating officer as to fault;
4.

The statement of Donald Kennedy, was in fact a sworn

statement and not a deposition. This being the case it is a prior
inconsistent statement and can be used to impeach and attack the
credibility of the witness and was appropriately used.
Finally, defendant Warren Yarnell maintains that this appeal
is a frivolous appeal designed to harass defendant and defense
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counsel and requests double costs and attorneys fees.
In sum, this court should affirm the trial court's decisions
on all four of the aforementioned

issues.

Further defendant

requests the court award him double costs and attorney fees for
filing a frivolous brief.
DATED this 4th day of September, 1992.
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5ARA L. MAW
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY

2

STATE OF UTAH

3

*****

4

TINA L . NOONAN,

PLAINTIFF,

5
6
7
8

VS.

REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

WARREN YARNELL,
DEFENDANT.

9
10

CASE NO. 900901422

*****

BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY

11

FOR HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE RONALD O. HYDE, JUDGE,

12

SITTING AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 18TH DAY OF JUNE 1992.

13

WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT:

14

*****

15

APPEARANCES:

16

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:

PAUL H. JOHNSON

17

FOR THE DEFENDANT:

BARBARA L. MAW

18

*****

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN
847 E. 2800 N.
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414
WK. 399-8405 HM. 782-3146

2
OGDEN, UTAH
THE COURT:

JUNE 18, 1992 11:00 A.M.

WHAT IS THIS ONE IN HERE ON NOW?

WHAT

ARE WE DOING?
MS. MAW:

IT'S OUR MOTION TO FORCE THE PLAINTIFF'S

ATTORNEY TO PAY FOR THE ENTIRE TRIAL TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL.
AND THEIR MOTION TO MAKE THE — WHAT WE CALL SWORN STATEMENT
OF DON KENNEDY PART OF THE APPELLANT'S RECORD.

AND OUR

OBJECTION TO THAT MOTION.
THE COURT:

ON WHAT BASIS ARE YOU GOING TO MAKE THEM

PAY FOR THE TRANSCRIPT OF THE WHOLE TRIAL?
MS. MAW:

THE BASIS FOR MAKING IT IS THEY'RE

ALLEGING THAT YOU CAN'T BE NEGLIGENT BUT NOT THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE OF THE INJURIES.

THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS YOU CAN BE NOT

THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, ONE OF WHICH IS YOU HAVE NEGLIGENTLY
CAUSED THE ACCIDENT, BUT NOT BE THE CAUSE OF HER INJURIES THAT
COULD HAVE PRE-EXISTED OR YOU COULD HAVE NEGLIGENTLY CAUSED
PART OF THE COLLISION, BUT SHE WAS
THE COURT:
APPEALING.

~

BUT THEY CAN DESIGNATE WHAT THEY'RE

IF THEY DON'T APPEAL THE WHOLE THING, THEY

DESIGNATE THE POTION OF IT THEY WANT AND HAVE THAT
TRANSCRIBED.

AND IF IT'S NOT SUFFICIENT, THEN THE SUPREME

COURT SAYS THAT'S NOT SUFFICIENT.

BUT I DON'T KNOW THAT IT'S

MY DUTY TO TELL THEM THEY GOT TO DO THE WHOLE TRIAL.

JUST DO

THE PORTION OF IT THEY WANT.
MS. MAW:

BECAUSE THEY ALLEGE THAT THE FINDING ON

3
1

THE SPECIAL VERDICT FORM WAS WHAT THEY WERE OBJECTING TO.

2

THAT'S VERY BROAD-BASED, SAYING THAT YOU CAN'T BE —

3

THE COURT:

AND

WHEN THEY GO TO THE APPELLATE COURT, THEY

4

HAVE TO TAKE WITH THEM SUFFICIENT INFORMATION AND SUFFICIENT

5

PORTIONS OF THE TRIAL TO SUBSTANTIATE WHAT THEY'RE TALKING

6

ABOUT.

7

THE TRIAL COVERS MANY THINGS OTHER THAN THAT.

8
9
10

MS. MAW:

RIGHT.

I —

I MEAN,

THEN IN THE EVENT THEY DON'T

WANT IT ALL AND IT'S NEEDED, THEN DEFERENCE IS GIVEN THE TRIAL
COURT UNDER THE RULE.

11
12

BUT I DON'T SEE THAT THEY HAVE TO DO IT ALL.

THE COURT:

THE TRIAL ITSELF COVERED AN AWFUL LOT

OTHER THAN JUST YOUR PORTION OF IT THEY'RE APPEALING.

13

MS. MAW:

BUT I GUESS OUR ARGUMENT IS BASICALLY

14

WHEN THEY'RE SAYING THAT YOU CAN'T BE —

15

YOU HAVE TO BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT.

16

CLEARLY AN ERRONEOUS STATEMENT, BUT WHEN THEY'RE MAKING THAT

17

BROAD-BASED STATEMENT SAYING IT'S IMPOSSIBLE FOR MR. YARNELL

18

TO HAVE BEEN NEGLIGENT BUT NOT BE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE, THEN

19

THAT LEAVES OPEN A WIDE RANGE AS TO WHAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE

20

IS.

21

NEGLIGENT, BUT HE DIDN'T CAUSE HER INJURIES BECAUSE THEY PRE-

22
23
24
25

IF YOU'RE NEGLIGENT,
THAT'S

I MEAN, DID HER INJURIES PRE-EXIST AND, THEREFORE, HE IS

EXISTED.

WAS HE NEGLIGENT IN CERTAIN BEHAVIOR, BUT SHE

ULTIMATELY TURNS IN FRONT OF HIM AND CAUSES HER OWN
ACCIDENTS.

SO THAT'S THE —

THE COURT:

I'M SURE THERE ARE, BUT WHEN THEY GET TO

4
1

THE APPELLATE COURT, IT'S THEIR BURDEN TO SUBSTANTIATE WHAT

2

THEY'RE CLAIMING.

3

AUTHORITY TO TELL THEM THEY GOT TO ORDER THE TRANSCRIPT FOR

4

THE WHOLE TRIAL IF ALL THEY'RE APPEALING IS A PORTION OF IT.
MS. MAW:

5

I DON'T SEE WHERE I'VE GOT ANY POWER OR

WELL, THE PORTION THEY'RE APPEALING FROM,

6

THOUGH, INVOLVES THE ENTIRE TRIAL.

7

OUT?

8

BECAUSE THAT'S PART OF WHAT THEY APPEALED WAS THE SPECIAL

9

VERDICT FORM.

10

HOW DO YOU SEPARATE IT

THAT'S WHERE I'M HAVING TROUBLE ON THIS SPECIAL VERDICT

THAT'S THE ULTIMATE FINDING

THE COURT:

—

THAT'S KIND OF BETWEEN THEM AND THE

11

APPELLATE COURT, ISN'T IT?

12

THEY HAVEN'T BROUGHT HERE ENOUGH FOR US TO DETERMINE IT. I

13

DON'T SEE —

14

TO DO THE WHOLE TRIAL, TRANSCRIBE THE WHOLE TRIAL?

15

REQUIREMENT BASICALLY IS THAT THEY DO SUFFICIENT TO —

16

DESIGNATE THE RECORD THAT THEY WANT.

17
18
19
20
21

THE APPELLATE COURT MAY TELL THEM

WHAT RULE IS IT THAT SAYS THAT I CAN ORDER THEM

MS. MAW:

OKAY.

THE
THEY

WELL, DOESN'T RULE 11 OF THE UTAH

RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE —
THE COURT:

BUT WHY DO THEY HAVE TO DO THE WHOLE

THING?
MS. MAW:

THAT GIVES US THE AUTHORITY TO ORDER HIM

22

TO PAY THE ENTIRE — TO HAVE THE COURT ORDER HIM TO ORDER THE

23

ENTIRE TRANSCRIPT.

24
25

THE COURT:

GOSH, WHAT YOU GOT IS DOCTORS AND YOU

HAVE A LOT IN HERE THAT WOULD BE VERY EXPENSIVE AND

1
2

UNNECESSARY.
MS. MAW:

OKAY.

IN ANY EVENT, I WOULD LIKE HIM TO

3

ORDER ALL THE COPIES OF EVERYTHING THAT TRANSPIRED IN CHAMBERS

4

IF HE HASN'T ALREADY ORDERED THAT.

5

HE HAD ORDERED THAT.

6

THE COURT:

I HAVE NO IDEA WHAT HE —

7

MR. JOHNSON:

WE THOUGHT WE HAD, AND WE WOULDN'T OBJECT

MR. JOHNSON INDICATED THAT

8

TO THAT. AND IF MR. OLSEN WOULD CHECK AND MAKE SURE, IF

9

THERE'S ADDITIONAL IN-CHAMBERS TESTIMONY THAT HASN'T BEEN

10

TRANSCRIBED, WE'LL CERTAINLY PAY FOR THAT AND ASK THAT TO BE

11

TRANSCRIBED.

12

WE THOUGHT WE HAD ALREADY DESIGNATED THAT.

MS. MAW:

SEE, BUT UNDER THE RULE THAT I WAS

13

REFERRING TO, UNDER RULE 11(E), SUBSECTION THREE IT JUST SAYS,

14

UNLESS WITHIN TEN DAYS AFTER SERVICE OF SUCH DESIGNATION, THE

15

APPELLANT HAS REQUESTED SUCH PARTS AND HAS SO NOTIFIED THE

16

APPELLEE, THE APPELLEE MAY WITHIN THE FOLLOWING TEN DAYS

17

EITHER REQUEST THE PARTS OR MOVE IN THE TRIAL COURT FOR AN

18

ORDER REQUIRING THE APPELLANT TO DO SO.

19
20
21
22

SO THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN YOU THE AUTHORITY IF YOU DEEMED
IT NECESSARY.
THE COURT:

I DON'T DEEM THE WHOLE TRIAL NECESSARY TO

APPEAL THE PORTION OF IT.

23

MS. MAW:

CAN'T ARGUE WITH THAT.

24

THE COURT:

WHAT'S THE OTHER QUESTION?

25

MR. JOHNSON:

OKAY.

I MEAN

~

THE OTHER MOTION, YOUR HONOR, IS

6
1

WE HAVE THE ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPT OF DONALD KENNEDY THAT SHOWS

2

THE CHANGES AND I THINK JUST BY OVERSIGHT WE ASKED — WE

3

NEGLECTED TO HAVE THAT PUBLISHED AND PUT IN THE RECORD.

4
5

THE COURT:

THIS WAS THAT ONE THAT WAS THE STATEMENT

THAT THEY OBJECTED TO SO MUCH

6

MR. JOHNSON:

RIGHT.

7

THE COURT:

—

8

—

BECAUSE SHE WENT OUT AND TOOK A

STATEMENT, AND YOU KEPT SAYING IT'S A DEPOSITION AND THAT —
MR. JOHNSON:

RIGHT.

10

MS. MAW:

YES.

11

MR. JOHNSON:

THIS WAS ALLOWED TO BE USED AT THE TRIAL,

9

12
13

BUT THE

~

THE COURT:

THE ONLY USE AT TRIAL WAS AS A PRIOR

14

INCONSISTENT STATEMENT THAT COULD BE TAKEN ANYWAY.

15

GO OUT AND TAKE IT THEMSELVES.

16

DOESN'T HAVE TO BE UNDER OATH —

THEY COULD

IT COULD BE UNDER OATH.

17

MR. JOHNSON:

WELL —

18

THE COURT:

~

19

MR. JOHNSON:

ALL WE WANT TO HAVE IT IN THE RECORD FOR

20

IT'S NOT PART OF THE TOTAL RECORD.

IS FOR THE APPELLATE COURT TO SEE WHAT THE ACTUAL

21

THE COURT:

WELL, A PORTION

22

MR. JOHNSON:

—

23
24
25

~

—

DOCUMENT WAS WHAT WAS DONE BECAUSE

THAT'S WHAT WE'RE OBJECTING TO IS TO ALLOWING IT TO COME IN AT
ALL UNDER ANY —
THE COURT:

I NEVER ALLOWED THE DOCUMENT TO COME IN,

7
1

BUT I CERTAINLY ALLOWED HER TO USE IT AS A PRIOR INCONSISTENT

2

STATEMENT.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

RIGHT.

4

THE COURT:

ANY PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT

5

MR. JOHNSON:

OUR CONTENTION IS THAT THE WHOLE — THE

BUT OUR CONTENTION

—
~

6

WHOLE DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A DEPOSITION AND IT WAS TAKEN

7

WITHOUT PROPER NOTICE BEING GIVEN.

8
9

THE COURT:

I KNOW YOU'RE TAKING THAT POSITION AND

THAT'S THE POSITION YOU TOOK DURING THE TRIAL AND I, FRANKLY,

10

HAVE NEVER UNDERSTOOD IT.

IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION.

AND THAT'S

11

PART OF WHAT WE TOOK IN CHAMBERS, AS I RECALL.

12

IS THEY WENT OUT AND THEY TOOK A COURT REPORTER AND TOOK A

13

STATEMENT.

WHAT THEY DID

14

MR. JOHNSON:

UNDER OATH.

15

THE COURT:

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THAT MAKE?

16

MR. JOHNSON:

WELL

17

THE COURT:

THAT DOES NOT MAKE IT A DEPOSITION.

18
19
20
21

~
IT

COULD NOT BE USED AS A DEPOSITION.
MR. JOHNSON:

I UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION ON THIS, BUT I

THINK THAT THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD HAVE THE —
THE COURT:

THE APPELLATE COURT, IF THEY READ THE

22

RECORD, THE PORTIONS OF IT, SHE WOULD HAVE REFERRED TO THAT AS

23

A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT.

24
25

MR. JOHNSON:

UNDER RULE 11, IT'S ALLOWED.

I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT UNLESS THE

APPELLATE COURT HAS THE WHOLE DOCUMENT IN FRONT OF THEM, THEY

8
1

CAN'T MAKE A DECISION ON OUR ISSUE ON APPEAL BECAUSE THEY

2

DON'T KNOW WHAT —

3

MOTION TO THE TRIAL COURT TO HAVE THIS ADDED OR WE CAN —

4

WHICH I THINK WAS APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT IN TIME SINCE —

5

WHAT'S THERE.

THE COURT:

AND WE CAN EITHER MAKE THIS

I DON'T SEE HOW THIS MAKES ANY

6

DIFFERENCE.

I DON'T THINK THE APPELLATE COURT'S GOING TO TELL

7

YOU IT'S A DEPOSITION BECAUSE IT'S NOT.

8

USE IT AS A DEPOSITION

9

MR. JOHNSON:

YOU NEVER TRIED TO

~

I UNDERSTAND —

I UNDERSTAND YOUR ~

YOUR

10

POSITION ON THIS, BUT I BELIEVE THAT THE APPELLATE COURT OUGHT

11

TO HAVE THE WHOLE DOCUMENT, ORIGINAL DOCUMENT IN FRONT OF THEM

12

SO THEY CAN FORM THEIR OPINION.

13

BITS AND PIECES AND THEY DON'T HAVE THE WHOLE PICTURE.

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

THE COURT:

OTHERWISE, ALL THEY HAVE IS

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS SAYS THAT'S

REALLY ALL YOU NEED IS BITS AND PIECES, ISN'T IT?
MR. JOHNSON:

ALL I ~

IF THAT'S WHAT THEY DECIDE, THAT'S —

IF THEY DECIDE IT'S A DEPOSITION AND GO WITH OUR POSITION —
THE COURT:

I DON'T KNOW HOW YOU CAN POSSIBLY SAY

IT'S A DEPOSITION.
MR. JOHNSON:

WELL, I KNOW THAT'S YOUR POSITION, I

UNDERSTAND THAT'S YOUR POSITION.

22

THE COURT:

YOU HAVE SOME OBJECTION TO IT?

23

MS. MAW:

I DON'T WANT THE WHOLE DOCUMENT IN.

24
25

BUT

IT'S

BEING OFFERED TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER ASSERTED, IT'S
NOT PART —

PRIOR —

IT'S A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT AND

9
1
2
3
4

THEY DID NOTHING TO OPPOSE THE —
THE COURT:

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS AREN'T

HEARSAY.
MS. MAW:

5

PURPOSES.

6

THEY'RE NOT USED —

NO.

THEY'RE USED FOR IMPEACHMENT

THEY'RE AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE, BUT
THE PARTS I USED WERE TO IMPEACH BOTH

—

7

THE COURT:

WHICH WAS PERFECTLY PROPER

8

MR. JOHNSON:

WELL, YOUR HONOR, I BELIEVE OUR ARGUMENT

9
10

—

IS THE MANNER IN WHICH SHE DID THIS WAS VERY PREJUDICIAL TO
OUR CASE.

11

THE COURT:

I THINK WHAT YOU HAVE

—

12

MR. JOHNSON:

BASICALLY IS UNDERMINING THE WHOLE

13

PURPOSE OF DISCOVERY AND HAVING A FAIR CHANCE TO GET FAIR

14

EVIDENCE.

15

THE COURT:

IT WASN'T DISCOVERY

16

MR. JOHNSON:

I —

17

THE COURT:

— ALL IT WAS IS A STATEMENT.

18

WHAT UPSETS DURBANO.

19

REPORTER.

20

STATEMENT, YOU WOULDN'T BE COMPLAINING ABOUT IT.

21

TRIED TO USE IT —

22
23

—

THAT'S

YOU OBJECTED TO THERE BEING A COURT

IF SHE HAD JUST SENT SOMEBODY OUT AND SAID TAKE HIS

MR. JOHNSON:

SHE NEVER

SHE TOOK IT UNDER OATH, THAT MADE A

DIFFERENCE.

24

THE COURT:

WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES THAT MAKE?

25

MS. MAW:

DOESN'T MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE.

10
MR. JOHNSON:

1

WELL, REGARDLESS OF WHAT YOUR POSITION IS

2

ON IT, I WANT TO HAVE IT IN FRONT OF THE APPELLATE COURT SO

3

THEY CAN MAKE A JUDGEMENT ON IT.

4
5
6

THE COURT:

I GUESS —

I GUESS THERE'S NO REASON NOT

MS. MAW:

YOUR HONOR, I'M GOING TO OBJECT TO THAT

TO.

7

BECAUSE THEY'RE GOING TO USE THAT TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF THE

8

MATTER ASSERTED.

9

HE HASN'T SUPPLIED AN AFFIDAVIT

THE COURT:

WHAT THEY —

—

IF I UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY'RE

10

CLAIMING IS THAT IT'S IN EFFECT A DEPOSITION AND THEY WANT TO

11

SHOW THEM THAT IT'S A DEPOSITION AND THEY DO THAT BY REASON OF

12

THE FACT THAT YOU USED THE REPORTER AND PUT HIM UNDER OATH.

13

THAT DOESN'T MAKE IT A DEPOSITION.

14

THE DOCUMENT, WHY COULDN'T THEY LOOK AT THE DOCUMENT?

15

MS. MAW:

IF THEY WANT THEM TO SEE

BECAUSE HE SHOULD HAVE —

IF HE HAD

16

WANTED AT THE TIME OF TRIAL ~

17

THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE COURT REPORTER WHICH CLEARLY SAYS SHE

18

MISTAKENLY ENTITLED IT A DEPOSITION INSTEAD OF A SWORN

19

STATEMENT.

20
21

FIRST OF ALL, HE DIDN'T OPPOSE

SO I WANT TO PUT THIS —

THE COURT:

THIS IS ONE OF THE THINGS WE RULED IN

CHAMBERS, ISN'T IT?

22

MS. MAW:

RIGHT.

23

THE COURT:

IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION.

24

MS. MAW:

IT'S NOT A DEPOSITION.

25

MR. JOHNSON:

YES.

11
1

THE COURT:

YOU COULD NOT USE IT AS A DEPOSITION.

2

MS. MAW:

IT SHOULD NOT BE PART OF THE COURT'S

3
4

RECORD BECAUSE IT IS NOT A DEPOSITION.
MR. JOHNSON:

BUT THE FACT THAT YOU RULED ON IT IN

5

CHAMBERS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT WAS A DEPOSITION, I THINK

6

ENTITLES US TO HAVE IT IN THE RECORD SO THAT THEY CAN SEE THE

7

BASIS FOR YOUR RULING.

8
9

MS. MAW:

BUT YOU HAVEN'T COME FORWARD AND SHOWN

THAT IT'S A DEPOSITION.

YOU HAVEN'T PUT ONE PIECE OF EVIDENCE

10

FORWARD BEFORE THIS COURT TODAY THAT SHOWS THAT'S A DEPOSITION

11

OTHER THAN YOUR WORD.
THE COURT:

FOR THE LIMITED PURPOSE OF LETTING THE

13

APPELLATE COURT LOOK AT IT, I SEE NO REASON THAT THEY CAN'T

14

LOOK AT IT.

15

YOU'RE NOT GOING TO MAKE IT INTO A DEPOSITION.

I DON'T SEE THAT IT'S GOING TO CHANGE ANYTHING.

16

MR. JOHNSON:

NO.

17

THE COURT:

IF THE APPELLATE COURT MAKES IT INTO A

18
19

MR. JOHNSON:
HERE.

21

COME IN —

23
24
25

WE BELIEVE —

DEPOSITION, THEY'LL SURE BE CHANGING THE RULES.

20

22

WELL, WE —

WHICH I THINK THERE'S A POLICY ISSUE

YOU CONDUCT THIS DISCOVERY AND IF THEY ALLOW THIS TO

THE COURT:

THEY DIDN'T.

MR. JOHNSON:

THEY'RE JUST OPENING UP A WHOLE—

THE COURT:

IT DIDN'T COME IN.

PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT.

IT WASN'T.

SHE USED IT AS A

THAT'S THE SOLE AND TOTAL USE

12
1

SHE USED IT FOR.

2

MR. JOHNSON:

WELL, I JUST —

3

THE COURT:

YOU CAN DO THAT, YOU CAN USE ANY

4

STATEMENT OF ANY —

5

WHATEVER.

6

IT WAS TAKEN UNDER OATH DOES NOT MAKE IT A DEPOSITION.

7

LET THEM LOOK AT IT.

8

ORAL, WRITTEN, UNDER OATH, NOT UNDER OATH,

SO LONG AS IT'S A PRIOR STATEMENT.

MR. JOHNSON:

9

FOR A MINUTE.

10

MS. MAW:

OKAY.

LETS ~

THE FACT THAT

I'LL LET HER LOOK AT IT

NO, I DON'T NEED TO LOOK AT IT.

11

KNOW IF IT'S A DOCUMENT BECAUSE YOU'RE NOT CREDIBLE.

12

ANYWAY

13

I DON'T
BUT

—

THE COURT:

14

A LOOK AT IT.

15

MS. MAW:

16

BUT

I'LL LET YOU INCLUDE IT SO THEY CAN TAKE

I DON'T SEE ANYTHING WRONG WITH THAT.
YOUR HONOR, WILL YOU ORDER HIM TO HAVE

THIS PROCEEDING TRANSCRIBED

—

17

MR. JOHNSON:

OH, SURE.

18

MS. MAW:

~

19

THE COURT:

THAT WAS EASY.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

OKAY.

21

MS. MAW:

IT'S USED NOT —

22

THE COURT:

SEE THE CLERK HERE.

23

MS. MAW:

YOUR HONOR, I WANT A POINT OF

AS WELL?

THAT'S FINE.

24

CLARIFICATION.

25

ONLY TO BE USED TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT'S A DEPOSITION OR A

IT'S ONLY TO BE USED ~

YOU'RE RULING IT'S

13
1
2
3

SWORN STATEMENT?
THE COURT:

HE WANTS THEM TO LOOK AT IT TO SEE WHAT

IT IS.

4

MR. JOHNSON:

RIGHT.

5

THE COURT:

IF IT WAS A DEPOSITION, IT WAS A

6
7
8
9

DEPOSITION.
MS. MAW:

WE TAKE THE POSITION IT WAS NOT.

FOR THAT LIMITED PURPOSE —
MR. JOHNSON:

RIGHT.

10

THE COURT:

YEAH.

11

MR. JOHNSON:

AND OTHER THAN THAT —

12

THE COURT:

—

13

JUST

YOU'RE NOT INTERESTED IN WHAT THE REST

OF IT IS.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

BE IN THE RECORD IS —

16

INTO THE RECORD AT TRIAL, IS THAT RIGHT?

17

THE COURT:

18

THAN DIDN'T YOU MAKE

OTHER THAN THAT THE ONLY THING THAT WOULD
ARE THE ACTUAL PARTS THAT WERE READ

IT WAS NEVER READ INTO THE RECORD OTHER
~

19

MR. JOHNSON:

SHE REFERRED TO IT IN —

20

THE COURT:

SURE SHE DID, THAT'S TRUE-

21

MR. JOHNSON:

—

22

THE COURT:

— AS A PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENT,

23
24
25

IN CROSS-EXAMINATION

—

WHICH SHE HAS A RIGHT TO DO.
MR. JOHNSON:

I BELIEVE YOU GAVE IT TO THE COURT

REPORTER SO HE COULD GET IT VERIFIED, WHAT THOSE QUESTIONS

14
1
2
3

WERE OR THE STATEMENTS FROM I T ,
THE COURT:

SO —

YOU GUYS ARE FIGHTING THIS TOOTH AND

NAIL —

4

MS. MAW:

WHY, I DON'T KNOW.

5

MR. JOHNSON:

OKAY.

6

MS. MAW:

OKAY.

7

MR. JOHNSON:

I GUESS I PREPARE THE ORDER.

8

THE COURT:

UH-HUH.

9

MR. JOHNSON:

OKAY.

MS. MAW:

MAKE SURE YOU PUT THE LIMITED PURPOSE IN

10
11

THERE.

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

OTHERWISE, I WON'T SIGN THE ORDER.

12

THE COURT:

OKAY.

13

MS. MAW:

THANK YOU.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

YEAH, WELL, JUST LET ME CLARIFY, BARBARA,

15

THE ONLY REASON WE WANT IT IN THERE IS TO LET —

16

APPELLATE COURT TO SEE WHAT JUDGE HYDE RULED ON WHEN HE WAS IN

17

CHAMBERS AND MADE A RULING —

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

THE COURT:

AND THAT'S WHAT WE SAID.

ALLOW THE

THEY CAN PUT IT

IN FOR THE PURPOSE SO THEY CAN SEE WHAT IT IS WE'RE TALKING
ABOUT.
MR. JOHNSON:

OKAY.

THANK YOU.
*****
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Utah Code Ann- §41-6-49:
41-6-49. Minimum speed regulations.
(1) A person may not operate a motor vehicle at a speed so
slow as to impede or block the normal and reasonable
movement of traffic except when:
(a) reduced speed is necessary for safe
operation;
(b) upon a grade; or
(c) in compliance with official traffic
control devices.
(2) Operating a motor vehicle on a controlled access
highway at less than the lawful maximum speed side by
side with and at the same speed as a vehicle operated
in the adjacent right lane constitutes evidence of
impeding or blocking normal movement of traffic.
(3) When the Department of Transportation or local
authorities within their respective jurisdictions determine
on the basis of an engineering and traffic investigation
that slow speeds on any part of a highway consistently
impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic, the
Department of Transportation or local authority may
determine and shall post a minimum speed limit below which
no person may operate a vehicle except when necessary for
safe operation.
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-55:
41-6-55.

Overtaking and passing vehicles proceeding in
same direction.

The overtaking and passing of vehicles proceeding in
the same direction is subject to the following
provisions:
(1) The operator of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction shall pass to the left at a
safe distance and may not again drive to the right side of
the roadway until safely clear of the overtaken vehicle.
(2) The operator of an overtaken vehicle shall give way to
the right in favor of the overtaking vehicle and may not
increase the speed of his vehicle until completely passed by
the overtaking vehicle.
(3) On a highway having more than one lane in the same
direction, the operator of a vehicle traveling in a left
1

lane shall, upon being overtaken by another vehicle in the
same lane, yield to the over-taking vehicle by moving safely
to the right, and may not impede the movement or free flow
of traffic in a left lane except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another
vehicle proceeding in the same direction;
(b) when preparing to turn left;
(c) when reasonably necessary in response to
emergency conditions;
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33
Rule 33:

Damages for delay or frivolous appeal;
recovery of attorney's fees.

(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal.
Except in a first appeal of right in a
criminal case, if the court determines that a
motion made or appeal taken under these rules
is either frivolous or for delay, it shall
award just damages, which may include single
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the
prevailing party. The court may order that
the damages be paid by the party or by the
party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these
rules, a frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or
other paper is one that is not grounded in
fact, not warranted by existing law, or not
based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for
any improper purpose such as to harass, cause
needless increase in the cost of litigation,
or gain time that will benefit only the party
filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon
request of any party or upon its own motion.
A party may request damages under this rule
only as part of the appellee's motion for
summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's

2

response to a motion or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the
motion of the court, the court shall issue to
the party or the party's attorney or both an
order to show cause why such damages should
not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form
the basis of the damages and permit at least
ten days in which to respond unless otherwise
ordered for good cause shown. The order to
show cause may be part of the notice of oral
argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom
damages may be awarded, the court shall grant
a hearing.
4.

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 34.
Rule 34. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise
provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed,
costs shall be taxed against the appellant
unless otherwise agreed by the parties or
ordered by the court; if a judgment or order
is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against
appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a
judgment or order is reversed, costs shall be
taxed against the appellee unless otherwise
ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed
or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs
shall be allowed as ordered by the court.
Costs shall not be allowed or taxed in a
criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah.
In cases involving the state of Utah or any
agency or officer thereof, an award of costs
for or against the state shall be at the
discretion of the court unless specifically
required or prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record,
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The
following may be taxed as costs in favor of
the prevailing party in the appeal: the
actual costs of a printed or typewritten
brief or memoranda and attachments not to

3

exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs
incurred in the preparation and transmission
of the record, including costs of the
reporter's transcript unless otherwise
ordered by the court; premiums paid for
supersedeas or cost bonds to preserve rights
pending appeal; and the fees for filing and
docketing the appeal.
(d) Bill of costs taxed after remittitur.
When costs are awarded to a party in an
appeal, a party claiming costs shall, within
15 days after the remittitur is filed with
the clerk of the trial court, serve upon the
adverse party and file with the clerk of the
trial court an itemized and verified bill of
costs. The adverse party may, within 5 days
of service of the bill of costs, serve and
file a notice of objection, together with a
motion to have the costs taxed by the trial
court. If there is no objection to the cost
bill within the allotted time, the clerk of
the trial court shall tax the costs as filed
and enter judgment for the party
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 40.
Rule 40. Attorney's or party's certificate;
sanctions and discipline.
(a) Attorney's or party's certificate. Every
motion, brief, and other paper of a party
represented by an attorney shall be signed by
at least one attorney of record who is an
active member in good standing of the Bar of
this state. The attorney shall sign his or
her individual name and give his or her
business address, telephone number, and Utah
State Bar number. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign any
motion, brief, or other paper and state the
party's address and telephone number. Except
when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, motions, briefs, or other papers
need not be verified or accompanied by
affidavit. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate that the
4

attorney or party has read the motion, brief,
or other paper; that to the best of his or
her knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after reasonable inquiry, it is not
frivolous or interposed for the purpose of
delay as defined in Rule 33. If a motion,
brief, or other paper is not signed as
required by this rule, it shall be stricken
unless it is signed promptly after the
omission is called to the attention of the
attorney or party. If a motion, brief, or
other paper is signed in violation of this
rule, the authority and the procedures of the
court provided by Rule 33 shall apply.
(b) Sanctions and discipline of attorneys and
parties. The court may, after reasonable
notice and an opportunity to show cause to
the contrary, and upon hearing, if requested,
take appropriate action against any attorney
or person who practices before it for
inadequate representation of a client,
conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar or a
person allowed to appear before the court, or
for failure to comply with these rules or
order of the court. Any action to suspend or
disbar a member of the Utah State Bar shall
be referred to the Ethics and Discipline
Committee of the State Bar for proceeding in
accordance with the Rules of Discipline of
the State Bar.
(c) Rule does not affect contempt power. This
rule shall not be construed to limit or
impair the court's inherent and statutory
contempt powers.
(d) Appearance of counsel pro hac vice. An
attorney who is licensed to practice before
the bar of another state or a foreign country
but who is not member of the Bar of this
state, may appear, upon motion, pro hac vice.
Such attorney shall associate with an active
member in good standing of the Bar of this
state and shall be subject to the provisions
of this rule and all other rules of appellate
procedure.

5

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 702
Rule 702.

Testimony by experts.

If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 704
Rule 704.

Opinion on ultimate issue.

Testimony in the form of an opinion or
inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 801
Rule 801.

Definitions.

The following definitions apply under this
article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an
oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal
conduct of a person, if it is intended by him
as an assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a
person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted.
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A
statement is not hearsay if:
(1) Prior statement by witness: The
declarant testifies at the trial or hearing

6

and is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement and the statement is
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the
witness denies having made the statement or
has forgotten, or (B) consistent with his
testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent
fabrication or improper influence or motive,
or (C) one of identification of a person made
after perceiving him; or
(2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and is
(A) his own statement, in either his
individual or a representative capacity, or
(B) a statement of which he has manifested
his adoption or belief in its truth, or (C) a
statement by a person authorized by him to
make a statement concerning the subject, or
(D) a statement by his agent or servant
concerning a matter within the scope of his
agency or employment, made during the
existence of the relationship, or (E) a
statement by a coconspirator of a party
during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy.
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